

Advanced Algorithms (Fall 2023)

# Primal Dual

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- 1 Duality of Linear Programming
  - Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem Using LP Duality
  - 0-Sum Game and Nash Equilibrium
- 2 2-Approximation Algorithm for Weighted Vertex Cover Using Primal-Dual
- 3 3-Approximation Algorithm for Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem Using Primal Dual

$$\min \quad 7x_1 + 4x_2$$


$$x_1 + x_2 \geq 5$$

$$x_1 + 2x_2 \geq 6$$

$$4x_1 + x_2 \geq 8$$

$$x_1, x_2 \geq 0$$

- optimum solution:  $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 4$
- optimum value =  $7 \times 1 + 4 \times 4 = 23$



**Q:** How can we give a lower bound for the linear program, without solving it?

$$\min \quad 7x_1 + 4x_2$$

$$x_1 + x_2 \geq 5$$

$$x_1 + 2x_2 \geq 6$$

$$4x_1 + x_2 \geq 8$$

$$x_1, x_2 \geq 0$$

- $7x_1 + 4x_2 \geq 2(x_1 + x_2) + (x_1 + 2x_2) \geq 2 \times 5 + 6 = 16$
- $7x_1 + 4x_2 \geq (x_1 + x_2) + (x_1 + 2x_2) + (4x_1 + x_2) \geq 5 + 6 + 8 = 19$
- $7x_1 + 4x_2 \geq 3(x_1 + x_2) + (4x_1 + x_2) \geq 3 \times 5 + 8 = 23$

**Q:** How can we obtain the best (i.e., largest) lower bound using this method?

### Primal LP

$$\min \quad 7x_1 + 4x_2$$

$$x_1 + x_2 \geq 5$$

$$x_1 + 2x_2 \geq 6$$

$$4x_1 + x_2 \geq 8$$

$$x_1, x_2 \geq 0$$

### Dual LP

$$\max \quad 5y_1 + 6y_2 + 8y_3$$

$$y_1 + y_2 + 4y_3 \leq 7$$

$$y_1 + 2y_2 + y_3 \leq 4$$

$$y_1, y_2, y_3 \geq 0$$

### A general method to prove a lower bound

$$\begin{aligned} & 7x_1 + 4x_2 \quad (\text{if } 7 \geq y_1 + y_2 + 4y_3 \text{ and } 4 \geq y_1 + 2y_2 + y_3) \\ & \geq y_1(x_1 + x_2) + y_2(x_1 + 2x_2) + y_3(4x_1 + x_2) \quad (\text{if } y_1, y_2, y_3 \geq 0) \\ & \geq 5y_1 + 6y_2 + 8y_3 \end{aligned}$$

- to achieve the largest lower bound: **maximize**  $5y_1 + 6y_2 + 8y_3$

$$\min \quad 7x_1 + 4x_2$$

$$x_1 + x_2 \geq 5$$

$$x_1 + 2x_2 \geq 6$$

$$4x_1 + x_2 \geq 8$$

$$x_1, x_2 \geq 0$$

$$\max \quad 5y_1 + 6y_2 + 8y_3$$

$$y_1 + y_2 + 4y_3 \leq 7$$

$$y_1 + 2y_2 + y_3 \leq 4$$

$$y_1, y_2, y_3 \geq 0$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 \\ 4 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad b = \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ 6 \\ 8 \end{pmatrix} \quad c = \begin{pmatrix} 7 \\ 4 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\min \quad c^T x$$

$$Ax \geq b$$

$$x \geq 0$$

$$\max \quad b^T y$$

$$A^T y \leq c$$

$$y \geq 0$$

## Primal LP

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & c^T x \\ & Ax \geq b \\ & x \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

## Dual LP

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & b^T y \\ & A^T y \leq c \\ & y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

## Relationships

Primal LP	dual LP
variables	constraints
constraints	variables
obj. coefficients	RHS constants
RHS constants	obj. coefficients

## More Relationships

Primal LP	Dual LP
variable in $\mathbb{R}$	equities
equities	variable in $\mathbb{R}$

## Primal LP

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & c^T x \\ & Ax \geq b \\ & x \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

## Dual LP

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & b^T y \\ & A^T y \leq c \\ & y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- $P :=$  value of primal LP
- $D :=$  value of dual LP

**Theorem** (Weak Duality Theorem)  
 $D \leq P.$

## Proof.

- $x$ : an arbitrary solution to Primal LP
- $y$ : an arbitrary solution to Dual LP
- $b^T y \leq (Ax)^T y = x^T A^T y \leq x^T c = c^T x.$

□



**Theorem** (Strong Duality Theorem)  $D = P$ .

## Proof of Strong Duality Theorem

**Lemma** (Variant of Farkas Lemma)  $Ax \leq b, x \geq 0$  is infeasible, if and only if  $y^T A \geq 0, y^T b < 0, y \geq 0$  is feasible.

- $\forall \epsilon > 0, \begin{pmatrix} -A \\ c^T \end{pmatrix} x \leq \begin{pmatrix} -b \\ P - \epsilon \end{pmatrix}, x \geq 0$  is infeasible
- There exists  $y \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^m, \alpha \geq 0$ , such that  $(y^T, \alpha) \begin{pmatrix} -A \\ c^T \end{pmatrix} \geq 0,$   
 $(y^T, \alpha) \begin{pmatrix} -b \\ P - \epsilon \end{pmatrix} < 0$
- we can prove  $\alpha \neq 0$ ; assume  $\alpha = 1$
- $-y^T A + c^T \geq 0, -y^T b + P - \epsilon < 0 \iff A^T y \leq c, b^T y > P - \epsilon$
- $\forall \epsilon > 0, D > P - \epsilon \implies D = P$  (since  $D \leq P$ )  $\square$

- duality is mutual: the dual of the dual of an LP is the LP itself.

### Primal LP

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & b^T y \\ & A^T y \leq c \\ & y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

### Dual LP

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & c^T x \\ & Ax \geq b \\ & x \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Duality theorem holds when one LP is infeasible:
- Minimization LP is infeasible  $\implies$  value =  $\infty$   
 $\iff$  dual LP value =  $\infty \implies$  feasible region of dual LP is unbounded

# Complementary Slackness

## Primal LP

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & c^T x \\ & Ax \geq b \\ & x \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

## Dual LP

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & b^T y \\ & A^T y \leq c \\ & y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- $x^*$  and  $y^*$ : optimum primal and dual solutions
- $D = b^T y^* \leq (Ax^*)^T y^* = (x^*)^T A^T y^* \leq (x^*)^T c = c^T x^* = P$ .
- $P = D$ : all the inequalities hold with equalities.

## Complementary Slackness

- $y_i^* > 0 \implies \sum_j a_{ij} x_j^* = b_i$ .
- $x_j^* > 0 \implies \sum_i a_{ij} y_i^* = c_j$ .

# Simple Example for Duality: Brewery problem

Beverage	Corn (pounds)	Hops (pounds)	Malt (pounds)	Profit (\$)
Ale (barrel)	5	4	35	13
Beer (barrel)	15	4	20	23
Constraint	480	160	1190	

## Primal LP

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & 13x + 23y \\ & 5x + 15y \leq 480 \\ & 4x + 4y \leq 160 \\ & 35x + 20y \leq 1190 \\ & x, y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

## Dual LP

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & 480\alpha + 160\beta + 1190\gamma \\ & 5\alpha + 4\beta + 35\gamma \geq 13 \\ & 15\alpha + 4\beta + 20\gamma \geq 23 \\ & \alpha, \beta, \gamma \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ : the value of 1 pound of corn, hops and malt respectively.

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & 480\alpha + 160\beta + 1190\gamma \\ & 5\alpha + 4\beta + 35\gamma \geq 13 \\ & 15\alpha + 4\beta + 20\gamma \geq 23 \\ & \alpha, \beta, \gamma \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

### Covering LP

- $\min c^T x$ , s.t.  $Ax \geq b, x \geq 0$ ,  $A, b, c$  are non-negative
- increasing values of variables can not make the solution feasible

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & 13x + 23y \\ & 5x + 15y \leq 480 \\ & 4x + 4y \leq 160 \\ & 35x + 20y \leq 1190 \\ & x, y \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

### Packing LP

- $\max c^T x$ , s.t.  $Ax \leq b, x \geq 0$ ,  $A, b, c$  are non-negative
- decreasing values of variables (still guaranteeing the non-negativity) can not make the solution infeasible

The dual of a covering LP is a packing LP, and vice versa.


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## Maximum Flow Problem

**Input:** flow network  
( $G = (V, E), c, s, t$ )

**Output:** maximum value of a  
 $s$ - $t$  flow  $f$



## LP for Maximum Flow


$$\max \sum_{e \in \delta^{\text{in}}(t)} x_e$$

$$x_e \leq c_e \quad \forall e \in E$$

$$\sum_{e \in \delta^{\text{out}}(v)} x_e - \sum_{e \in \delta^{\text{in}}(v)} x_e = 0 \quad \forall v \in V \setminus \{s, t\}$$

$$x_e \geq 0 \quad \forall e \in E$$

# An Equivalent Packing LP



- $\mathcal{P}$ : the set of all simple paths from  $s$  to  $t$
- $f_P, P \in \mathcal{P}$ : the flow on  $P$

$$\max \sum_{P \in \mathcal{P}} f_P$$

$$\min \sum_{e \in E} c_e y_e$$

$$\sum_{P \in \mathcal{P}: e \in P} f_P \leq c_e \quad \forall e \in E$$

$$\sum_{e \in P} y_e \geq 1 \quad \forall P \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$f_P \geq 0 \quad \forall P \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$y_e \geq 0 \quad \forall e \in E$$

- dual constraints: the shortest  $s$ - $t$  path w.r.t weights  $y$  has length  $\geq 1$



## Dual LP

$$\min \sum_{e \in E} c_e y_e$$

$$\sum_{e \in P} y_e \geq 1 \quad \forall P \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$y_e \geq 0 \quad \forall e \in E$$

**Theorem** The optimum value can be attained at an integral point  $y$ .

## Maximum Flow Minimum Cut

**Theorem** The value of the maximum flow equals the value of the minimum cut.

## Proof of Theorem.

- Given any optimum  $y$ , let  $d_v$  be the length of shortest path from  $s$  to  $v$ , for every  $v \in V$ .  $d_s = 0, d_t = 1$
- Randomly choose  $\theta \in (0, 1)$ , and output cut  $(S := \{v : d_v \leq \theta\}, T := \{v : d_v > \theta\})$
- Lemma:  $\mathbb{E}[\text{cut value of}(S, T)] \leq \sum_{e \in E} c_e y_e$
- Any cut  $(S, T)$  in the support is optimum □

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \max \quad \sum_{P \in \mathcal{P}} f_P \\
 & \sum_{P \in \mathcal{P}: e \in P} f_P \leq c_e \quad \forall e \in E \\
 & f_P \geq 0 \quad \forall P \in \mathcal{P}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min \quad \sum_{e \in E} c_e y_e \\
 & \sum_{e \in P} y_e \geq 1 \quad \forall P \in \mathcal{P} \\
 & y_e \geq 0 \quad \forall e \in E
 \end{aligned}$$

- pros of new LP: it is a packing LP, dual is a covering LP, easier to understand and analyze
- cons of new LP: exponential size, can not be solved directly
  - when we only need to do non-algorithmic analysis
  - ellipsoid method with separation oracle can solve some exponential size LP

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## 0-Sum Game

**Input:** a **payoff** matrix  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ ,  $m, n \geq 1$ ,

two players: **row player R**, **column player C**

**Output:** R plays a row  $i \in [m]$ , C plays a column  $j \in [n]$

payoff of game is  $M_{ij}$

R wants to **minimize**  $M_{ij}$ , C wants to **maximize**  $M_{ij}$

## Rock-Scissor-Paper Game

payoff	R	S	P
R	0	-1	1
S	1	0	-1
P	-1	1	0

- game depends on who plays first

By allowing **mixed strategies**, each player has a best strategy, regardless of who plays first

	row player R	column player C
pure strategy	row $i \in [m]$	column $j \in [n]$
mixed strategy	distribution $x$ over $[m]$ $x \in [0, 1]^m, \sum_{i=1}^m x_i = 1$	distribution $y$ over $[n]$ $y \in [0, 1]^n, \sum_{j=1}^n y_j = 1$

$$M(x, y) := \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n x_i y_j M_{ij}$$

$$M(x, j) := \sum_{i=1}^m x_i M_{ij}, \quad M(i, y) := \sum_{j=1}^n y_j M_{ij}$$

- If R plays a mixed strategy  $y$  first, then it is the best for C to play a pure strategy  $j$ . Value of game is  $\inf_x \max_{j \in [n]} M(x, j)$ .
- If C plays a mixed strategy  $x$  first, then it is the best for R to play a pure strategy  $i$ . Value of game is  $\sup_y \min_{i \in [m]} M(i, y)$ .

## Theorem (Von Neumann (1928), Nash's Equilibrium)

$$\inf_x \max_{j \in [n]} M(x, j) = \sup_y \min_{i \in [m]} M(i, y).$$

**Coro.**  $\inf_x \sup_y M(x, y) = \sup_y \inf_x M(x, y).$

**Coro.** There are mixed strategies  $x^*$  and  $y^*$  satisfying  $M(x, y^*) \geq M(x^*, y^*), \forall x$  and  $M(x^*, y) \leq M(x^*, y^*), \forall y.$

### Proof.

- $V := \inf_x \sup_y M(x, y) = \sup_y \inf_x M(x, y)$
- $x^*$ : the strategy  $x$  that minimizes  $\sup_y M(x, y)$
- $y^*$ : the strategy  $y$  that maximizes  $\inf_x M(x, y)$
- $M(x^*, y^*) \leq V, M(x^*, y^*) \geq V \implies M(x^*, y^*) = V$
- $M(x^*, y) \leq V, \forall y$  and  $M(x, y^*) \geq V, \forall x.$



- As long as the first player can play a mixed strategy, then he will not be at a disadvantage.
- If both players can play mixed strategies, then they do not need to know the strategy of the other player.

**Def.**  $\inf_x \sup_y M(x, y) = \sup_y \inf_x M(x, y)$  is called the **value** of the game. The two strategies  $x^*$  and  $y^*$  in the corollary are called the **optimum strategies** for R and C respectively.

**Theorem** (Von Neumann (1928), Nash's Equilibrium)

$$\inf_x \max_{j \in [n]} M(x, j) = \sup_y \min_{i \in [m]} M(i, y).$$

- Can be proved by LP duality.

### LP for Row Player

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & R \\ \sum_{i=1}^m x_i &= 1 \\ R - \sum_{i=1}^m M_{ij}x_i &\geq 0 \quad \forall j \in [n] \\ x_i &\geq 0 \quad \forall i \in [m] \end{aligned}$$

### LP for Column Player

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & C \\ \sum_{j=1}^n y_j &= 1 \\ C - \sum_{j=1}^n M_{ij}y_j &\leq 0 \quad \forall i \in [m] \\ y_j &\geq 0 \quad \forall j \in [n] \end{aligned}$$

- The two LPs are dual to each other.

$x_i, i \in [m]$	primal variable ( $\in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ )	dual constraint ( $\leq$ )
$y_j, j \in [n]$	dual variable ( $\in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ )	primal constraint ( $\geq$ )
$R$	primal variable ( $\in \mathbb{R}$ )	dual constraint ( $=$ )
$C$	dual variable ( $\in \mathbb{R}$ )	primal constraint ( $=$ )



- Let  $V$  be the value of the game,  $x^*$  and  $y^*$  be the two optimum strategies. Complementary slackness implies:
  - If  $x_i^* > 0$ , then  $M(i, y^*) = V$ .
  - If  $y_j^* > 0$ , then  $M(x^*, j) = V$ .
- The game is called 0-sum game as the payoff for R is the negative of the payoff for C.

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## LP Relaxation

$$\min \sum_{v \in V} w_v x_v$$

$$x_u + x_v \geq 1 \quad \forall (u, v) \in E$$

$$x_v \geq 0 \quad \forall v \in V$$

## Dual LP

$$\max \sum_{e \in E} y_e$$


$$\sum_{e \in \delta(v)} y_e \leq w_v \quad \forall v \in V$$

$$y_e \geq 0 \quad \forall e \in E$$

- Algorithm constructs **integral primal solution**  $x$  and dual solution  $y$  simultaneously.

## Primal-Dual Algorithm for Weighted Vertex Cover Problem

- 1:  $x \leftarrow 0, y \leftarrow 0$ , all edges said to be **uncovered**
- 2: **while** there exists at least one uncovered edge **do**
- 3:     take such an edge  $e$  arbitrarily
- 4:     increasing  $y_e$  until the dual constraint for one end-vertex  $v$  of  $e$  becomes tight
- 5:      $x_v \leftarrow 1$ , claim all edges incident to  $v$  are **covered**
- 6: **return**  $x$



### Lemma

- 1  $x$  satisfies all primal constraints
- 2  $y$  satisfies all dual constraints
- 3  $P \leq 2D \leq 2D^* \leq 2 \cdot \text{opt}$   
 $P := \sum_{v \in V} x_v$ : value of  $x$   
 $D := \sum_{e \in E} y_e$ : value of  $y$   
 $D^*$ : dual LP value

## Proof of $P \leq 2D$ .


$$\begin{aligned} P &= \sum_{v \in V} w_v x_v \leq \sum_{v \in V} x_v \sum_{e \in \delta(v)} y_e = \sum_{(u,v) \in E} y_{(u,v)} (x_u + x_v) \\ &\leq 2 \sum_{e \in E} y_e = 2D. \end{aligned}$$

□

- a more general framework: construct an arbitrary **maximal** dual solution  $y$ ; choose the vertices whose dual constraints are tight
- $y$  is maximal: increasing any coordinate  $y_e$  makes  $y$  infeasible
- primal-dual algorithms do not need to solve LPs
- LPs are used in analysis only
- faster than LP-rounding algorithm in general

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## Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem

**Input:**  $F$ : potential facilities       $C$ : clients

$d$ : (symmetric) metric over  $F \cup C$        $(f_i)_{i \in F}$ : facility opening costs

**Output:**  $S \subseteq F$ , so as to minimize  $\sum_{i \in S} f_i + \sum_{j \in C} d(j, S)$

- 1.488-approximation [Li, 2011]
- 1.463-hardness of approximation,  $1.463 \approx \text{root of } x = 1 + 2e^{-x}$

- $y_i$ : open facility  $i$ ?
- $x_{i,j}$ : connect client  $j$  to facility  $i$ ?

## Basic LP Relaxation

$$\min \sum_{i \in F} f_i y_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in C} d(i, j) x_{i, j}$$


$$\sum_{i \in F} x_{i, j} \geq 1 \quad \forall j \in C$$

$$x_{i, j} \leq y_i \quad \forall i \in F, j \in C$$

$$x_{i, j} \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in F, j \in C$$

$$y_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in F$$

**Obs.** When  $(y_i)_{i \in F}$  is determined,  $(x_{i, j})_{i \in F, j \in C}$  can be determined automatically.





## Basic LP Relaxation

$$\min \sum_{i \in F} f_i y_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in C} d(i, j) x_{i,j}$$


$$\sum_{i \in F} x_{i,j} \geq 1 \quad \forall j \in C$$

$$x_{i,j} \leq y_i \quad \forall i \in F, j \in C$$

$$x_{i,j} \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in F, j \in C$$

$$y_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in F$$

- LP is not of covering type
- harder to understand the dual
- consider an equivalent covering LP
- idea: treat a solution as a set of **stars**



- $(i, J), i \in F, J \subseteq C$ : star with center  $i$  and leaves  $J$
- $\text{cost}(i, J) := f_i + \sum_{j \in J} d(i, j)$ : cost of star  $(i, J)$
- $x_{i,J} \in \{0, 1\}$ : if star  $(i, J)$  is chosen

### Equivalent LP

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{(i,J)} \text{cost}(i, J) \cdot x_{i,J} \\ & \sum_{(i,J):j \in J} x_{i,J} \geq 1 \quad \forall j \in C \\ & x_{i,J} \geq 0 \quad \forall (i, J) \end{aligned}$$

### Dual LP

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_{j \in C} \alpha_j \\ & \sum_{j \in J} \alpha_j \leq \text{cost}(j, J) \quad \forall (i, J) \\ & \alpha_j \geq 0 \quad \forall j \in C \end{aligned}$$

- both LPs have exponential size, but the final algorithm can run in polynomial time

$$\min \sum_{(i,J)} \text{cost}(i, J) \cdot x_{i,J}$$

$$\sum_{(i,J):j \in J} x_{i,J} \geq 1 \quad \forall j \in C$$

$$x_{i,J} \geq 0 \quad \forall (i, J)$$

$$\max \sum_{j \in C} \alpha_j$$


$$\sum_{j \in J} \alpha_j \leq \text{cost}(j, J) \quad \forall (i, J)$$

$$\alpha_j \geq 0 \quad \forall j \in C$$

- $\alpha_j$ : budget of  $j$
- dual constraints: total budget in any star is  $\leq$  its cost
- $\implies \text{opt} \geq \text{total budget} = \text{dual value}$

# Construction of Dual Solution $\alpha$

- $\alpha_j$ 's can only increase
- $\alpha$  is always feasible
- if a dual constraint becomes tight, **freeze** all clients in star
- unfrozen clients are called **active** clients



## Construction of Dual Solution $\alpha$

- 1:  $\alpha_j \leftarrow 0, \forall j \in C$
- 2: **while** exists at least one active client **do**
- 3:     increase the budgets  $\alpha_j$  for all active clients  $j$  at uniform rate, until (at least) one new client is frozen


# Construction of Dual Solution $\alpha$

- $\blacksquare$ : tight facilities; they are temporarily open
- $\square$ : permanently closed
- $t_i$ : time when facility  $i$  becomes tight
- construct a bipartite graph:  $(i, j)$  exists  $\iff \alpha_j > d(i, j)$ ,

$\alpha_j > d(i, j)$ :  $j$  contributes to  $i$ , (solid lines)

$\alpha_j = d(i, j)$ :  $j$  does not contribute to  $i$ , but its budget is just enough for it to connect to  $i$  (dashed lines)


$\alpha_j < d(i, j)$ : budget of  $j$  is not enough to connect to  $i$



# Construction of Integral Primal Solution

## Construction of Integral Primal Solution


- 1:  $S \leftarrow \emptyset$ , all clients are **unowned**
- 2: **for** every temporarily open facility  $i$ , in increasing order of  $t_i$  **do**
- 3:     **if** all (solid-line) neighbors of  $i$  are unowned **then**
- 4:          $S \leftarrow S \cup \{i\}$ , open facility  $i$
- 5:         connect to all its neighbors to  $i$
- 6:         let  $i$  own them
- 7: connect unconnected clients to their nearest facilities in  $S$



- $S$ : set of open facilities
  - $C_1$ : clients that make contributions
  - $C_2$ : clients that do not make contributions
- 
- $f$ : total facility cost
  - $c_j$ : connection cost of client  $j$
  - $c = \sum_{j \in C} c_j$ : total connection cost
  - $D = \sum_{j \in C} \alpha_j$ : value of  $\alpha$

### Lemma

- $f + \sum_{j \in C_1} c_j \leq \sum_{j \in C_1} \alpha_j$
- for any client  $j \in C_2$ , we have  $c_j \leq 3\alpha_j$



## Lemma

- $f + \sum_{j \in C_1} c_j \leq \sum_{j \in C_1} \alpha_j$
- for any client  $j \in C_2$ , we have  $c_j \leq 3\alpha_j$

- So,  $f + c = f + \sum_{j \in C} c_j \leq 3 \sum_{j \in C} \alpha_j = 3D \leq 3 \cdot \text{opt.}$

- stronger statement:

$$3f + c = 3f + \sum_{j \in C} c_j \leq 3 \sum_{j \in C} \alpha_j = 3D \leq 3 \cdot \text{opt.}$$



## Proof of $\forall j \in C_2, c_j \leq 3\alpha_j$

- at time  $\alpha_j$ ,  $j$  is frozen.
- let  $i$  be the temporarily open facility it connects to
- $i \in S$ : then  $c_j \leq \alpha_j$ . assume  $i \notin S$ .
- there exists a client  $j'$ , which made contribution to  $i$ , and owned by another facility  $i' \in S$
- $d(j, i) \leq \alpha_j$
- $d(j', i) < \alpha_{j'}, d(j', i') < \alpha_{j'}$
- $\alpha_{j'} = t'_i \leq t_i \leq \alpha_j$
- $d(j, i') \leq d(j, i) + d(i, j') + d(j', i') \leq \alpha_j + \alpha_j + \alpha_j = 3\alpha_j$

